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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
 
The United States District Court for the Territory of New 
Union Island exercised federal question jurisdiction over the 
Plaintiffs’ claims against the United States of America under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) and jurisdiction for the Alien Tort Statute 
(ATS) claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). The District Court 
entered its judgement on August 15, 2018, dismissing all of 
Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal. This 
court has jurisdiction over the order of the District Court pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012). 
 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
 
I. May a claim be brought under the ATS against a 
domestic corporation, as a general, categorical matter? 
 
II. Is the Trail Smelter Principle a recognized principle of 
customary international law enforceable as a Law of 
Nations under the ATS? 
 
 
III. Does the Trail Smelter Principle impose obligations 
enforceable against non- governmental actors? 
 
IV. Does the Clean Air Act (CAA) displace ATS claims 
alleging violation of the Trail Smelter Principle for 
harms caused by greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions? 
 
 
V. Should this court create a federal public trust cause of 
action and a new Fifth Amendment substantive Due 
Process right for the global climate system? 
 
VI. Do Plaintiffs’ attempts to use the ATS and public trust 
doctrine to regulate GHG emissions present non-
justiciable political questions? 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol10/iss1/5
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
This case is an appeal of an order of the District Court for New 
Union Island granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs—
an alien national, a U.S. citizen, and a not-for-profit organization—
had sought injunctive and monetary relief for harms caused by 
global climate change and sea level rise, allegedly induced by 
greenhouse gas emissions attributable to HexonGlobal’s fossil 
fuels and the United States government’s failure to more 
significantly control such emissions. This case is ultimately about 
the scope of a court’s power to extend common law solutions to the 
global problem of climate change, and whether such solutions have 
already been or should be decided by the political branches. This 
appeal is also about whether a court should craft its decision on 
grounds broader than necessary to resolve the case. In dealing with 
these complex issues, the District Court correctly held that the 
Clean Air Act displaces Plaintiffs’ claim brought under the Alien 
Tort Statute for HexonGlobal’s alleged violations of the Trail 
Smelter Principle. The District Court also correctly declined to 
extend an unprecedented Due Process-based public trust claim to 
government protection of a stable climate system. 
 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
 
I. Parties 
 
Plaintiffs include: Apa Mana (Mana), an alien national of the 
island nation A’Na Atu; Noah Flood (Flood), a U.S. Citizen and 
resident of New Union Island, a United States territory; and the 
Organization of Disappearing Island Nations (ODIN), a not-for-
profit membership organization representing the interests of 
island nations threatened by sea level rise. Record at 3. Defendants 
are the United States federal government and HexonGlobal, a U.S. 
corporation created from the merger of all major U.S. oil producers. 
R. at 5. 
 
II.  Plaintiffs’ Alleged Injuries from Climate Change 
 
Climate change is a global phenomenon caused by an 
overabundance of GHGs in the atmosphere, which is largely 
3
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attributable to the burning of fossil fuels for energy (electricity, 
heat, and transportation), as well as emissions from agricultural 
and industrial activity. R. at 4. Some impacts of climate change 
include rising temperatures, rising sea levels, more intense storms, 
and ocean acidification. R. at 4–5. 
Plaintiffs Flood and Mana reside and own homes on islands 
whose populated areas are at an elevation projected to be 
completely inundated by sea level rise and rendered uninhabitable 
by the end of the century if current GHG emissions trends 
continue. R. at 4–5. Due to rising sea levels, Flood and Mana have 
suffered seawater damage to their homes and drinking water 
wells. Id. Further, rising temperatures threaten their health by 
increasing risk of heat stroke and mosquito-borne diseases, while 
ocean acidification threatens to deplete the fish population, which 
is their primary food supply. R. at 5. 
 
III. HexonGlobal’s GHG Contributions 
 
Defendant HexonGlobal is an oil producer that is incorporated 
in New Jersey, has its primary place of business is in Texas, and 
operates refineries throughout the world, including in New Union 
Island. Id. HexonGlobal and its predecessors are responsible for 
32% of the United States’ cumulative fossil fuel-related GHG 
emissions and 6% of global historical emissions. Id. 
 
IV. The United States’ Management of GHG Emissions 
 
Activities in the United States are responsible for 20% of 
cumulative global human- caused GHG emissions. R. at 6. The U.S. 
government has sought to address the dual needs for energy 
production and environmental protection through a variety of 
programs, commitments, and regulations. On one hand, the United 
States promotes energy production by providing tax subsidies for 
fossil fuel production, leasing lands and waters for energy 
production, developing an interstate highway system, and creating 
public agency-run power plants. Id. On the other hand, the United 
States has acknowledged the threat of climate change and made 
commitments and taken steps to regulate GHG emissions from a 
comprehensive range of sources. Id. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol10/iss1/5
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In 1992, the United States Senate ratified the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Id.; 
UNFCCC, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, 169. This Convention, 
seeking to achieve “stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations . . . at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system,” committed 
the nation parties to “adopt national policies and take 
corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change, by 
limiting its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and 
protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs.” 
Id. at 169–71. 
The United States has fulfilled this international commitment 
in numerous ways. First, Congress adopted the CAA, which 
requires the United States Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) to regulate “air pollutants” from a comprehensive range of 
sources, including (but not limited to) motor vehicles under Section 
202, 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2012); new, modified and existing 
stationary sources such as power plants under Section 111, id. at 
§7411(b), (d), (f); and commercial aircrafts, id. at §7571(q). The 
Supreme Court confirmed that, under the CAA, the EPA can 
regulate GHGs as “air pollutants” from motor vehicles under 
Section 202(a), R. at 6; Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 
(2007), as well as from stationary sources under Section 111. R. at 
9; Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut (AEP), 564 U.S. 410, 424–26 
(2011). In 2009, the EPA issued an “endangerment finding,” 
recognizing that GHGs pose a threat to public health, and 
triggering the EPA’s CAA duty to regulate GHGs from motor 
vehicles. R. at 6; 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009). The EPA 
subsequently regulated GHG emissions from new motor vehicles 
under the CAA, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,323, 25,329–30 (May 7, 2010); 77 
Fed. Reg. 62,624, 62,638 (Oct. 15, 2012); medium-and heavy-duty 
trucks, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,106 (Sept. 15, 2011); 81 Fed. Reg. 73,478 
(Oct. 25, 2016); new power plants pursuant to Section 111(b), 80 
Fed. Reg. 64,510 (Oct. 23, 2015); and existing power plants 
pursuant to Section 111(d), Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661 
(Oct. 23, 2015). The EPA also issued regulations pertaining to 
GHG emissions from new and modified sources under the Act’s 
Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Program, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 7470–7479, and Title V permitting program, Id. At §§ 7661–
7661f, 7602(j). 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010). However, the 
5
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Supreme Court limited application of these PSD and Title V 
regulations to sources that would be regulated anyway due to their 
non-GHG pollutants. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A. 
(UARG), 573 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2440–41, 2449 (2014); R. at 
7. 
Showing the complexity and political nature involved in 
regulating GHG emissions and addressing global climate change 
while balancing the economic, health, and safety needs of the 
nation, some of these administrative actions are being rolled back 
under President Trump. For example, the EPA repealed the Clean 
Power Plan. R. at 8; 83 Fed. Reg. 44746 (Aug. 31, 2018), and 
announced its intent to repeal other regulations. In addition, 
President Trump announced his intent to withdraw from the Paris 
Agreement. R. at 7. Congress, however, has not changed the CAA’s 
legislative scheme authorizing GHG regulation. 
 
V. Legal Claims Asserted 
 
Plaintiff Mana and ODIN brought suit against HexonGlobal 
under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), which allows United States 
District Courts to hear disputes brought by aliens for violations of 
a treaty of the United States or a law of nations. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 
(2012). Mana asserts that HexonGlobal’s GHG emissions, induced 
by the sale and production of fossil fuels, violates the principle 
announced in the Trail Smelter Arbitration, which holds that 
emissions within one country may not cause substantial harm in 
another country. R. at 8. 
Plaintiffs Flood and ODIN brought suit against the United 
States, asserting that the U.S. Constitution provides citizens a 
fundamental Due Process right to a healthy and stable climate 
system, actionable under a federal public trust doctrine. R. at 10. 
Although the public trust doctrine has not traditionally provided 
protections to the climate system or the atmosphere, Flood asserts 
the global climate system is common property the government has 
an obligation to protect. Id. Flood asserts the U.S. government 
failed to stop private parties from producing, selling, and 
combusting fossil fuels, and that this has infringed upon a 
potential fundamental right to a stable environment and violated 
the government’s public trust obligations. Id. 
 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol10/iss1/5
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VI. Procedural History 
 
The District Court properly dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims for 
failure to state a valid claim. R. at 10–11. Specifically, the District 
Court found that Mana’s claim under the ATS is displaced by the 
Clean Air Act. R. at 10. The Court also dismissed Plaintiff Flood’s 
claim, finding no legal basis for a Fifth Amendment right to 
government protection from atmospheric climate change under the 
public trust doctrine. R. at 11. Flood, Mana, and ODIN brought 
this appeal. 
 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
This court should affirm the District Court’s holding that the 
CAA displaces Plaintiffs’ claim brought under the ATS for 
HexonGlobal’s alleged violation of the Trail Smelter Principle. 
Likewise, this court should follow the District Court in declining to 
create an unprecedented Due Process-based public trust claim to a 
stable climate system. Alternatively, this court should find such 
claims are nonjusticiable political questions. Finally, this court 
should refrain from drawing its holding any broader and risk 
barring all valid ATS claims against corporate defendants or valid 
Trail Smelter Principle claims. We address the issues in the order 
presented by this court. 
First, the text, purpose, and history of the ATS permit claims 
against domestic corporations. The plain language of the ATS—
which allows aliens to bring civil actions for torts committed in 
violation of international norms—does not bar any specific type of 
defendant, and corporations have long been liable for torts. 
Categorically barring domestic corporate defendants would 
undermine the original purpose of the ATS, which was to avoid 
international friction by ensuring that foreign plaintiffs have a 
remedy for international law violations committed on U.S. soil or 
waters. Domestic corporate defendants do not inherently increase 
the risk of international friction, while barring claims against them 
could abet institution-wide harms and might provoke foreign 
nations to hold the United States accountable. Every U.S. Circuit 
Court of Appeals, except for the Second Circuit, agrees domestic 
corporations may be held liable under the ATS, and this court 
should follow. While Mana’s specific claim should not move 
7
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forward because it either has already been or should be addressed 
by the political branches, this court should not issue an 
unprecedented, sweeping rule barring all other ATS claims against 
corporations. 
Second, the Trail Smelter Principle is a recognized norm of 
customary international law actionable under the ATS because it 
passes Sosa’s two-step inquiry. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 
692, 725 (2004). The Trail Smelter Principle is a norm broadly 
accepted by civilized nations, as evidenced by its wide use in 
international treaties, declarations, conventions, and courts. 
Further, scholarly sources extensively refer to it as a customary 
international law. The Principle proscribes conduct—
transboundary pollution that directly harms people or property in 
another State—with sufficient specificity to make it enforceable 
under the ATS, while ensuring the courts’ floodgates will not be 
opened to claims of a different nature. Thus, the Trail Smelter 
Principle is actionable under the ATS for concrete harms of 
transboundary pollutants. 
Third, the Trail Smelter Principle imposes obligations on non-
governmental parties. The original arbitration required a private, 
Canadian smelter to make extensive operational changes. 
Therefore, this court should similarly allow claims brought under 
the ATS to impose obligations on non-state parties. However, even 
if this court were to decide the Principle is generally only 
enforceable against state actors, the court should allow liability 
against private parties acting under the color of state law, 
consistent with past precedent. 
Fourth, although the Trail Smelter Principle may be a valid 
cause of action under the ATS in other situations, Mana’s use of 
the Principle to address GHG emissions and climate change has 
been displaced by Congress with the CAA. Federal common law 
claims, such as those under the ATS, are displaced when a federal 
statute directly addresses the issue raised in the lawsuit. Mana’s 
claims are indistinguishable from holdings of the Supreme Court 
and lower courts that the CAA authorizes the regulation of GHGs 
from mobile and stationary sources and therefore displaces federal 
common law claims seeking to address GHGs. Further, the CAA 
affords Mana multiple avenues to enforce emissions standards, 
including the Citizen Suit and “International Air Pollution” 
provisions, and petitioning for a rulemaking. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol10/iss1/5
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Fifth, Plaintiffs stretch the public trust doctrine—a common 
law doctrine preventing the monopolization of navigable 
waterways—far beyond what any court or legislature has ever 
recognized, by providing protections to the global climate system. 
The U.S. Supreme Court clearly established that the public trust 
doctrine does not provide a cause of action under federal law, and 
Plaintiffs’ claim would require this court to invent a new 
fundamental right that dozens of courts emphatically rejected. 
Recognizing Plaintiffs’ public trust doctrine claim would require 
this court to contravene Supreme Court precedent and impose on 
the federal government a retroactive fiduciary duty to act as a 
global trustee to the atmosphere and climate system. 
Finally, even if Mana’s claim is not fully displaced by the CAA, 
and even if Flood could bring a Due Process claim under the public 
trust doctrine, these claims present nonjusticiable political 
questions the court should leave to the politically accountable 
executive and legislative branches. While a federal court is the 
appropriate venue for typical ATS claims, Plaintiffs’ claims stretch 
the ATS and Trail Smelter Principle beyond their scope to 
circumvent the legislative and executive branches’ international 
and domestic policy authority. Similarly, Plaintiffs’ claims would 
improperly use the public trust doctrine, a matter of state law, as 
a vehicle to set international climate change policy impacting every 
consumer of fossil fuels. Not only would these claims require this 
court to interfere with sensitive international policy decisions, 
crafting climate policy would require the court to make initial 
policy determinations on appropriate levels of GHGs and manage 
the standard for millions of people and corporations. 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
Circuit courts review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. 
Call Henry, Inc. v. United States, 855 F.3d 1348, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 
2017); Davis v. Billington, 681 F.3d 377, 379 (D.C. Cir. 2012). To 
survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must plead “enough facts to 
state a claim that is plausible on its face” and that rises “above the 
speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Co. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 
570 (2007). 
9
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ARGUMENT 
 
I. Claims Against Domestic Corporations May Be Brought 
Under the ATS 
 
The District Court asked, without answering, if a claim may 
be brought against a domestic corporation under the Alien Tort 
Statute (ATS). R. at 9. While there are other reasons Mana’s claim 
should not move forward, see infra §§ IV, VI, HexonGlobal’s 
corporate status is not one. As at least four justices on the Supreme 
Court agree, “[t]he text, history, and purpose of the ATS, as well as 
the long and consistent history of corporate liability in tort, confirm 
that tort claims for law-of-nations violations may be brought 
against [domestic] corporations under the ATS.” Jesner v. Arab 
Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1419 (2018) (Sotomayer, J., 
dissenting).1 
The ATS provides, in full, that “[t]he district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). As the District Court 
noted, R. at 8, the Supreme Court has placed some limits on ATS 
claims with regard to the allegedly violative conduct and who may 
be a defendant. First, a claim must allege a violation of an 
international “norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory.” 
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732. Second, adjudicating the claim must be an 
“appropriate” exercise of judicial discretion in light of the “serious 
separation-of-powers and foreign relations concerns” implicated by 
the ATS. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1403 (Kennedy, J., majority) 
(holding, under this second test, that it would be “inappropriate” 
to extend ATS liability to foreign corporations, due to foreign 
relations concerns) (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729). 
We apply the first test to Mana’s Trail Smelter claim in 
Sections II and III, infra, to examine what “conduct violates the 
law of nations” and whether the specific norm at issue requires 
that the “conduct must be undertaken by a particular type of 
 
1The Jesner majority only barred ATS claims against foreign corporations; 
neither the majority nor plurality decided if the ATS imposes liability on 
corporations generally. 138 S. Ct. at 402. 
  
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol10/iss1/5
  
2019] RUNNER UP - BEST BRIEF 127 
actor.” Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1436 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
However, this “norm-specific first step is inapposite to the 
categorical question [of] whether corporations may be sued under 
the ATS as a general matter.” Id. at 1420. Rather, this court’s 
threshold question of whether the ATS allows claims against 
domestic corporations may be answered in the affirmative under 
the second ATS test, because “nothing about the [domestic] 
corporate form in itself raises foreign policy concerns” that would 
require barring all claims against domestic corporations. Id. at 
1428. Although resolution of Mana’s specific claims must be to be 
left to the political branches, see §§IV, VI, a sweeping ban on all 
claims against domestic corporations contravene the text, purpose, 
and history of the ATS. 
A. The text of the ATS does not limit the type of 
available defendant 
“It is axiomatic that ‘[t]he starting point in every case 
involving construction of a statute is the language itself.’” 
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985) 
(citation omitted). First, the plain language of the ATS “provides 
no express exception for corporations.” Romero v. Drummond Co., 
552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008). In fact, the ATS “does not 
distinguish among classes of defendants” at all. Argentine Republic 
v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 438 (1989). By 
contrast, the ATS does expressly limit the class of permissible 
plaintiffs (to aliens). “That silence as to defendants cannot be 
presumed to be inadvertent.” Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1426 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). “Where Congress includes particular 
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section 
of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts 
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or 
exclusion.” Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) 
(citation omitted). Therefore, it can be inferred that Congress 
intentionally limited what plaintiffs may bring an ATS claim and 
intentionally chose not to limit range of available defendants. 
Second, the ATS allows aliens to bring “a civil action” for a 
“tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350. When Congress used the term of art “tort,” 
“it presumably kn[ew] and adopt[ed] the cluster of ideas that were 
attached.” Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952). 
“Corporations have long been held liable in tort under the federal 
11
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common law.” Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1425 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(citing Phila., Wilminton, & Balt. R.R. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. 202 
(1859). In sum, while the specific international norm issue in an 
ATS claim may only allow claims against certain actors, the 
statute itself does not create such limitations. 
B. The purpose of the ATS requires that domestic 
corporations be held liable 
“The ATS was intended to promote harmony in international 
relations by ensuring foreign plaintiffs a remedy for international-
law violations in circumstances where the absence of such a 
remedy might provoke foreign nations to hold the United States 
accountable.” Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1406 (Kennedy, J., majority). 
Given this purpose and the “foreign-policy and separation-of- 
powers concerns inherent in ATS litigation,” the Supreme Court 
has cautioned that ATS claims should be allowed only in “narrow 
circumstances” and “must be ‘subject to vigilant doorkeeping.’” Id. 
at 1398 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729). Closing the door entirely, 
however, would undermine Congress’ intent in passing the ATS. 
Courts should only bar a claim when allowing it to proceed will 
cause or has “caused significant diplomatic tensions.” Id. at 1406. 
In Jesner, the Court held that “foreign corporations may not 
be defendants in suits brought under the ATS,” in a case where 
claims were brought against Arab Bank for allegedly financing 
terrorism. Id. at 1407 (emphasis added). Because Arab Bank is a 
“major Jordanian financial institution,” and both Jordan and Arab 
Bank are counterterrorism allies of the United States, the 
prolonged litigation “caused significant diplomatic tensions.” Id. at 
1406. Considering this case to be demonstrative of a general axiom 
that “foreign corporate defendants create unique problems” in 
foreign relations, the Court explained it was necessary to set a 
categorical bar against judicially allowing foreign corporations to 
be defendants in ATS suits. Id. at 1407. 
In contrast to the Jesner Court’s concerns that imposing 
liability on foreign corporations provokes foreign policy 
consequences, “nothing about the [domestic] corporate form in 
itself raises foreign policy concerns” to a level that requires the 
court to create a new prohibition on claims against domestic 
corporations. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1428 (Sotomayer, J., dissenting). 
Rather, refusing to provide a remedy against a corporate defendant 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol10/iss1/5
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could actually raise the possibility of international friction—the 
precise situation the ATS was originally designed to avoid. For 
example, if a U.S. corporation engaged in piracy in U.S. waters or 
trafficked foreign individuals on U.S. soil, allowing only individual 
employees to be held liable would shirk “accountability for the 
institution-wide [violation of an international norm]. Absent a 
corporate sanction, that harm will persist unremedied.” Id. at 
1435. Domestic corporate accountability is therefore necessary 
under the ATS for the same reasons it is necessary generally—to 
cut-off institutionally supported and widespread injustices. There 
is no reason to conclude that, in enacting the ATS, Congress 
thought it was necessary to provide foreign plaintiffs with a 
piecemeal remedy for comparatively small harms caused by 
individuals, but not for larger harms caused by corporations. 
Creating a categorical bar against all domestic corporate liability 
would be using “a sledgehammer to crack a nut.” Id. at 1431. 
Instead, courts should ensure ATS claims adhere to the intent of 
the First Congress by enforcing the presumption against 
extraterritoriality applied in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 
569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013), and examining on a claim-by-claim 
basis whether the provision of a remedy would create international 
friction. 
C. Judicial precedent maintains that corporations may 
be held liable 
Every U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals except for the Second 
Circuit has allowed corporations to be held liable under the ATS.2 
In addition, the Supreme Court’s failure to categorically bar all 
corporate liability in the two occasions it expressly considered the 
question may indicate the Court’s agreement that it would be 
 
2 See Romero, 552 F.3d at 1315 (“The text of the Alien Tort Statute provides 
no express exception for corporations”); Beanal v. Freeport–McMoran, Inc., 197 
F.3d 161, 163 (5th Cir.1999) (implicitly allowing ATS jurisdiction over a 
corporation but ultimately dismissing the claim for failure to plead sufficient 
facts); Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 530–31 (4th Cir. 
2014) (holding that an ATS claim against a corporate defendant sufficiently 
“‘touch[ed] and concern[ed]’ the territory of the United States” base partially, but 
not entirely, on the defendant’s “status as a United States corporation”); Flomo v. 
Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017–1021 (7th Cir. 2011); Doe I v. 
Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1020–1022 (9th Cir. 2014); Doe VIII v. Exxon 
Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 40–55 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated on other grounds, 527 
Fed.Appx. 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013)).   
13
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inappropriate to draw a bright-line rule against domestic corporate 
liability under the ATS. See Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 114 (granting 
certiorari on the question of corporate liability under the ATS, but 
deciding the case based on the presumption against 
extraterritoriality); see also Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1394 (granting 
certiorari on the question of whether the ATS “categorically 
forecloses corporate liability,” but holding more Al Shimari v. 
CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 530–31 (4th Cir. 2014) 
(holding that an ATS claim against a corporate defendant 
sufficiently “‘touch[ed] and concern[ed]’ the territory of the United 
States” base partially, but not entirely, on the defendant’s “status 
as a United States corporation”) narrowly that the ATS bars 
foreign corporate liability). Moreover, the one federal court to 
expressly consider the reach of Jesner held that domestic corporate 
liability “fully aligns with the original goals of the ATS: to provide 
a federal forum for tort suits by aliens against Americans for 
international law violations,” and did not risk “offend[ing] any 
foreign government.” Al Shimari, 320 F. Supp. 3d 781, 787 (E.D. 
Va. 2018). Finally, “Congress’ failure to disturb [this] consistent 
judicial interpretation,” of allowing corporate liability under the 
ATS “may provide some indication that Congress at least 
acquiesces in, and apparently affirms, that [interpretation].” 
Monessen Southwestern R. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 338 (1988) 
(citation omitted). In sum, the judiciary’s consistent interpretation, 
the purpose of the ATS to avoid foreign policy concerns, and the 
statute’s silence on allowable defendants all counsel against 
categorically barring domestic corporate defendants under the 
ATS. 
 
II. The Trail Smelter Principal is a Recognized Principle 
of Customary International Law Enforceable Under the 
Alien Tort Statute 
 
As a general manner, the Trail Smelter Principle is actionable 
under the Alien Tort Statute as a “Law of Nations” because it is: 
(1) a norm widely accepted by civilized nations; and (2) defined 
with a specificity comparable to the three specific offenses 
recognized in 1789, as mandated by the Supreme Court in Sosa. 
542 U.S. at 725. While there were only “three principle offenses 
against the law of nations” when the ATS was passed, the Court 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol10/iss1/5
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has made clear that other causes of action can be brought so long 
as they are “specific, universal, and obligatory,” Id. at 726, 732 
(citation omitted), and the court uses “judgment about the practical 
consequences of making [new] cause[s] available to litigants in the 
federal courts.” Id. at 732–33. 
The Trail Smelter Principle is derived from the Trail Smelter 
Arbitration, an international conflict between Washington State 
and Canada. Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1965 (1941). 
A smelter in Canada emitted harmful air pollutants, which 
traveled fourteen miles south to Washington and harmed 
agriculture. Id. The panel announced that “no state has the right 
to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner to cause 
injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties 
or persons therein.” Id. As detailed below, this Principle is 
actionable as a law of nations under the ATS because it is widely 
accepted by civilized nations in a variety of domestic and 
international forums, and it proscribes a specific and definite 
harm. 
A. The Trail Smelter Principle is widely accepted by 
civilized nations as an obligatory norm of 
international law 
When deciding whether a customary norm exists under the 
ATS, courts “gauge[] [claims] against the current state of 
international law, looking to those sources [they] have long, albeit 
cautiously, recognized.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733. Customary 
international law is law which is “the general and consistent 
practice of states that is followed out of a sense of legal obligation.” 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
§§ 102, 103 (1987). See also Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724 (stating courts 
should look at “the customs and usages of civilized nations.” 
(quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)). Courts 
have found principles to be customary international law when 
embraced in international courts and tribunals, scholarly writings, 
and international agreements, among other sources. See Filártiga 
v. Pen ̃a- Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Statute of 
the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 
Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No. 993 (listing such sources as “competent 
proof”); see also Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law 
of the United States, §103 (stating these sources should be given 
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“substantial weight”). The Trail Smelter Principle is found in all of 
these sources, therefore satisfying Sosa’s first requirement. 
The principle announced in Trail Smelter has been repeated 
and agreed upon in several international contexts. Most notably, it 
was adopted by the Declaration of the 1972 Stockholm Conference 
on the Human Environment, under Principle 21, which was 
endorsed by 113 nations, including the United States. U.N. 
Conference on the Human Environment, Declaration of the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 5, U.N. Doc 
A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1 (June 16, 1972). The Trail Smelter Principle 
was also adopted by the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development in Principle 2, which was endorsed by 178 nations, 
including the United States. U.N. Conference on Environment and 
Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 
3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol.I) (Aug. 12, 1992). This 
principle was also repeated in the 2002 World Summit on 
Sustainable Development3, the 1979 Geneva Convention on Long 
Range Transnational Air Pollution4, the 1992 U.N. Framework 
Convention on Climate Change5, and the U.N. Convention on 
Biological Diversity6. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) also 
found the Trail Smelter Principle constitutes a “general obligation 
of states.” Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
Advisory Opinion, 1996 ICJ Rep. 226, 242, para. 29 (July 8). 
Further, the Principle has been reflected in scholarly works too 
numerous to quantify.7 This court should find the Trail Smelter 
 
3 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, Report of the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development, 29, U.N. Doc A/CONF.199/20/Rev.1 (Aug. 
26– Sept. 4, 2002).   
4 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, 
T.I.A.S. 10541, 18 I.L.M. 1442.   
5 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development: Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849.   
6 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on 
Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818.   
7 See, e.g. Alexandre Kiss & Dinah Shelton, International Environmental 
Law 107 (1991) (describing the Trail Smelter decision to have “laid out the 
foundations of international environmental law”); Rudiger Wolfrum, Purposes 
and Principles of International Environmental Law, 33 Ger. Y.B. Int’l L. 308, 309 
(1990) (“There is agreement in international law that, in general, transfrontier 
damage is prohibited. This prohibition has essentially been developed under 
customary international law.”); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Overview of the Existing 
Customary Legal Regime Regarding International Pollution, in International Law 
and Pollution 63 (Daniel B. Magraw Ed., 1991) (stating the obligation to prevent 
transboundary pollution is “well established”).   
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol10/iss1/5
  
2019] RUNNER UP - BEST BRIEF 133 
Principle meets Sosa’s first requirement because it has been widely 
embraced by the United Nations, the International Court of 
Justice, and various scholarly works. 
B. The conduct proscribed by the Trail Smelter 
Principle is defined with sufficient specificity 
When the ATS was adopted, the three recognized offenses 
were piracy, violations of safe conduct, and offenses against 
ambassadors. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724. However, the Supreme Court 
made clear that other Law of Nations claims may be asserted, so 
long as they are “defined with a specificity comparable to the 
features of the 18th-century paradigms,” id. at 725, so as not to 
open the floodgates to litigation for claims of a different nature. Id. 
at 732–33 (the “determination of whether a norm is sufficiently 
definite” must include consideration of practical consequences). 
International norms found to be defined with sufficient 
specificity include: state- sanctioned torture, Filártiga, 630 F.2d 
876; forced labor, Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 883 (C.D. 
Cal. 1997), aff’d in part, rev’d in part by 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 
2002); aerial pesticide fumigation, Arias v. Dyncorp, 517 F. Supp. 
2d 221 (D.D.C. 2007); aiding and abetting liability, Khulumani v. 
Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007); 
nonconsensual medical experimentation, Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 
562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009); and extrajudicial 
killings. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 36 (D.D.C. 2010). 
On the other hand, offenses found not to be specific enough to be 
enforced under the ATS include: the use of herbicides in wartime, 
In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 
43 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); and fraud. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 
(1975) (abrogated on other grounds). 
The Trail Smelter Principle prohibits a specific offense—
transboundary pollution that directly harms people or property in 
another State. It closely resembles a common law nuisance claim, 
which courts routinely adjudicate. While a norm must be “specific” 
and “definable” in accordance with Sosa, its precise contours need 
not be universally agreed upon. For example, in Sosa, the Court 
cited United States v. Smith to demonstrate what level of 
specificity piracy is defined within the international context. Sosa, 
542 U.S. at 732 (citing United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820)). 
In Smith, the Court acknowledged that while piracy is defined in 
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a variety of ways, there are certain core aspects of the principle 
that are universally understood. Smith, 18 U.S. at 160–62. 
Similarly, while the precise contours of the Trail Smelter Principle 
may differ based on a court’s interpretation, the core aspects of the 
principle remain clear, and specifically proscribe certain harmful 
and direct transboundary pollution. 
Although two courts found principles related to Trail Smelter 
to be defined with insufficient specificity, these courts failed to 
scrutinize whether the core aspects of the principles were defined 
with the required specificity under Sosa. See Amlon Metals v. FMC 
Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Beanal, 197 F.3d at 
166–67. By misapplying the standard, these courts failed to 
recognize that the Trail Smelter Principle does proscribe the 
specific conduct of direct transboundary pollution which causes 
concrete harms. Therefore, this court should hold the Trail Smelter 
Principle is actionable under the ATS as a customary international 
law. However, as explained in section VI, infra, Plaintiffs’ use of 
the principle for the indirect harms of global climate change stretch 
the doctrine too far. 
 
III. Trail Smelter Imposes Obligations on Non-State Actors 
 
This court should recognize that the Trail Smelter Principle 
imposes obligations on non-state actors who emit harmful 
pollutants that cause concrete damage in another country. When 
recognizing an international customary law norm under the ATS, 
a court must consider “whether [the norm] extends the scope of 
liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being 
sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or 
individual.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.20. As an initial matter, 
customary international law does not sweepingly foreclose 
imposing liability on non-state actors. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 
F.3d 232, 250 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding genocide violates 
international law, regardless of whether undertaken by state or 
non- state actor). 
While the Trail Smelter Principle frames liability on 
sovereigns, the original arbitration required the private smelter to 
change its internal smelter operations, a very costly endeavor. This 
court should not foreclose this type of redress in the future. 
Furthermore, even if this court were to find that the Principle does 
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not generally impose obligation on non-state actors, it should hold 
that obligations may be imposed upon private actors operating 
under the color of law. 
 
A. The Trail Smelter Arbitration imposed obligations 
on the privately-owned smelter  
 
 Although liability in the Trail Smelter Arbitration was framed 
in terms of the “state,” the arbitration imposed obligations on the 
private Canadian smelter by requiring it to make operational 
changes that would reduce its total emissions. See Trail Smelter 
Arbitration at 1977 (“Nothing shall relieve the Smelter from the 
duty of reducing the maximum Sulphur emission below the 
amount permissible.”). These required operational changes cost 
the smelter nearly $20 million. Catherine Prunella, An 
International Environmental Law Case Study: The Trail Smelter 
Arbitration, INTERNATIONAL POLLUTION ISSUES (2014). Therefore, 
the Trail Smelter Principle leaves open the door to imposing 
obligations on private actors. 
Although few other courts have considered the question of 
private liability under ATS claims using transboundary 
environmental law principles and customary international law, at 
least one court did consider the issue and found there were no 
obvious policy reasons against imposing liability on private parties 
for violations of such international law norms. In re Agent Orange. 
373 F. Supp. 2d at 58; but see Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 
969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997) (finding that a private corporation 
could not be bound by Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, 
and instead “could be bound to such principles by treaty [only]” or 
when acting under the color of law.). Even if this court is unwilling 
to recognize that the Trail Smelter Principle applies directly to 
private actors in all situations, the court should at least find such 
liability is allowed in some situations, including where private 
entities act under the color of law. 
 
B. Trail Smelter Principle imposes obligations on 
private parties acting under authority of a state 
 
It is a long-standing precedent that private actors may be held 
liable for international customary laws when they act under color 
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of law. See Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 376 (“[A] corporation found to 
be a state actor can be held responsible for human rights abuses 
which violate international customary law.”). Both Beanal and 
Arias considered claims under transboundary pollution principles, 
and implied that the Trail Smelter Principle imposes liability on 
private actors who operate under the color of law. Id. at 377 
(applying the color of law test to private defendant); Arias, 517 F. 
Supp. 2d at 227–28 (same). This court should hold consistent with 
those cases, and In re Agent Orange, and find the Trail Smelter 
Principle imposes obligations, at least in some instances, on 
private parties. 
 
IV. The CAA Displaces Mana’s Trail Smelter Claim Because 
the Supreme Court has Already Held the Act ‘Speaks 
Directly’ to the Issue of GHG Emissions 
 
The District Court correctly ruled that the CAA displaces 
Mana’s action under the ATS for alleged violation of the Trail 
Smelter Principle. R. at 9. ATS claims are considered “claims under 
federal common law.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732. “Federal common law 
is subject to the paramount authority of Congress.” Native Vill. of 
Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp. (Kivalina), 696 F.3d 849, 856 (9th 
Cir. 2012) (citing New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931). 
Therefore, Congress may displace a federal common law claim 
when it adopts a statute that implicitly or explicitly “speaks 
directly to the question at issue.” AEP, 564 U.S. at 424 (citation 
and quotations omitted). The court here should follow Supreme 
Court precedent, see Id., and find Mana’s claims are displaced by 
the CAA because: (A) greenhouse gas emissions are the thrust of 
the “particular issue” raised, Oneida Cty., N.Y. v. Oneida Indian 
Nation of New York State, 470 U.S. 226, 237 (1985) (citation 
omitted); (B) the “scope of the legislation and. . .scheme established 
by Congress” comprehensively address greenhouse gas emissions, 
Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 859 (Pro, J., concurring) (citing City of 
Milwaukee v. Illinois (“Milwaukee II”), 451 U.S. 304, 315 n. 8 
(1981); and (C) the “reach of remedial provisions” in the CAA leave 
no room for common law remedies. AEP, 564 U.S. at 425 (citing 
Oneida Cty., 470 U.S. at 237–239). 
A. The “particular issue” raised by Mana is GHG-
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induced climate change, which the Supreme Court 
held is displaced by the CAA 
“[T]he applicability of displacement is an issue-specific 
inquiry.” Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 856. Courts must examine the scope 
of the “question at issue” in the claim. AEP, 564 U.S. at 424. The 
thrust of Mana’s claim is that GHG emissions from the global sales 
and combustion of HexonGlobal’s fossil fuel products cause climate 
change and sea level rise, which harm Mana’s home and health, 
and the entire island of A’Na Atu. R. at 4–5. Mana claims this 
violates the Trail Smelter Principle, “which holds that 
emissions. . .within the territory of one nation must not be allowed 
to cause substantial harms in the territory of other nations.” R. at 
8. 
Mana’s claim is virtually indistinguishable from the common 
law nuisance claim in Kivalina, which sought damages based on 
the “conten[tion] that GHGs released by the Energy Producers [oil, 
energy, and utility companies] cross state lines and thereby 
contribute to the global warming that threatens the continued 
existence of its village.” Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 855. Mana’s claim 
also bears remarkable similarities to claims in AEP seeking 
abatement of GHG emissions from the defendants’ fossil-fuel fired 
power plants, which allegedly contributed to global warming that, 
in turn, risked harm to infrastructure, health, and public lands. 
AEP, 564 U.S. at 418–19. In each case, the Ninth Circuit and 
Supreme Court held, respectively, that such common law nuisance 
claims based on GHG emissions and climate change were displaced 
by the CAA. See Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 854; see also AEP, 564 U.S. 
at 424. 
 1. Emissions, not sales or production, are the 
heart of Mana’s claim 
To the extent Mana seeks to distinguish this case from AEP 
and Kivalina by fashioning the claim as one based on 
HexonGlobal’s production or sales of fossil fuels, R. at 9, rather 
than emissions, such a maneuver has already been attempted and 
failed in at least two district courts. See City of Oakland v. BP 
P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (rejecting 
Oakland’s assertion that AEP and Kivalina did not apply to a 
nuisance claim that alleged harm from the sale of fossil fuels, 
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reasoning the “harm alleged by our plaintiffs remains a harm 
caused by fossil fuel emissions, not the mere extraction or even sale 
of fossil fuels”); see also City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 
3d 466, 471–72 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). “If an oil producer cannot be sued 
under the federal common law for their own emissions, a fortiori 
they cannot be sued for someone else’s.” Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d 
at 1024. Therefore, because Mana alleges injuries from climate 
change caused by the emissions of fossil fuel combustion, not from 
fossil fuels on their own, AEP applies and this court should hold 
the CAA displaces Mana’s claim. 
2. International emissions are beyond the reach of 
U.S. courts 
To the extent Mana aims to distinguish this case from AEP 
and Kivalina by framing the claim as based on HexonGlobal’s 
“global” actions occurring outside of the United States, R. 5, such a 
tactic has already been attempted and failed in at least two district 
courts based on the presumption against extraterritoriality, which 
“constrains courts considering common law claims brought under 
the Alien Tort Statute” and bars claims that “reach[] conduct 
within the territory of another sovereign.” City of Oakland, 325 F. 
Supp. 3d at 1025 (quoting Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 117; see also City of 
New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 475. Alternatively, to the extent that 
Mana’s claim focuses on domestic emissions resulting in 
international harm, such issues are addressed and displaced by the 
CAA, as explained below. 
B. The scope of the CAA comprehensively addresses 
GHG emissions from a spectrum of sources, 
displacing Mana’s common law claims 
A federal common law claim is displaced if Congress provides 
“a sufficient legislative solution to the particular [issue] to warrant 
a conclusion that [the] legislation has occupied the field to the 
exclusion of federal common law.’” Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 856 
(quoting Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 777 
(7th Cir. 2011)). But, “[l]egislative displacement of federal common 
law does not require the ‘same sort of evidence of a clear and 
manifest [congressional] purpose’ demanded for preemption of 
state law.” AEP, 564 U.S. at 423 (citing Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 
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317). Further, “Congressional action, not executive action, is the 
touchstone of displacement analysis.” Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 858 
(citing AEP, 564 U.S. at 424). 
1. The CAA Directly and Comprehensively 
Addresses Emissions from Stationary and 
Mobile Sources, Regardless of the Status of 
Regulations 
The CAA directs the EPA to regulate “air pollutants” from a 
comprehensive range of sources, including but not limited to: motor 
vehicles, 42 U.S.C. §7521(a)(1) (2012); new, modified, and existing 
stationary sources (including power plants), Id. at §7411(b), (d), (f); 
and commercial aircrafts. Id. at §7571(q). The Supreme Court held 
that GHGs fit “well within the Clean Air Act’s capacious definition 
of ‘air pollutant,’” and therefore “the EPA has statutory authority 
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles.” 
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532. The Court subsequently and 
unanimously held in AEP that the EPA also has the authority to 
regulate GHGs from new, modified, and existing stationary 
sources under CAA Section 111, and such authority displaces 
federal common law nuisance claims related to GHG emissions 
from power plants. 564 U.S. at 424–26. The EPA subsequently 
regulated GHG emissions from a variety of mobile and stationary 
sources. R. at 6–7. Although the Court in UARG limited (but did 
not bar) EPA’s authority to regulate GHGs under some provisions 
of the CAA, its narrow holding left Massachusetts and AEP as good 
law, and the EPA maintains authority delegated by Congress to 
regulate GHG emissions from a spectrum of mobile and stationary 
sources. See UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2440–41, 2449; CONG. RES. SERV., 
R44807, U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE REGULATION AND LITIGATION: 
SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES, 22 (2017). Therefore, cases relying on 
AEP in holding that the CAA displaces federal common law claims 
for harms caused by GHGs also remain good law. See Kivalina, 696 
F.3d at 855 (citing AEP, 564 U.S. at 424); City of Oakland, 325 F. 
Supp. 3d at 1024; City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 471–72. 
2. “Congressional action” of the CAA displaces 
Mana’s claims, regardless of the status of 
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EPA’s regulations 
While the CAA’s implementing regulations may be truncated 
by the regulatory rollbacks of the Trump administration, see R. at 
7, this is not relevant to a court’s determination of displacement. 
“The critical point is that Congress delegated to EPA the decision 
whether and how to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions. . .the 
delegation is what displaces federal common law.” AEP, 564 U.S. 
at 426. The Court in AEP held that plaintiffs’ nuisance claims 
related to GHG emissions were displaced by the CAA regardless of 
whether the “EPA actually exercises its regulatory authority.” Id. 
at 425–26. Therefore, in our case, unless Congress rescinds its 
delegation of authority to EPA to regulate GHGs as air pollutants, 
Mana’s claims are displaced by the CAA under AEP, regardless of 
the status of EPA’s regulations. 
C. The CAA’s remedial provisions allow Mana to 
enforce or seek to change GHG standards set 
pursuant to the CAA, leaving no room for common 
law 
A third factor courts consider in determining if federal 
common law is displaced is the statute’s “reach of remedial 
provisions” or enforcement mechanisms. AEP, 564 U.S. at 425. 
However, “the type of remedy asserted is not relevant to the 
applicability of the doctrine of displacement. . .if a cause of action 
is displaced, displacement is extended to all remedies.” Kivalina, 
696 F.3d at 857 (emphasis added) (holding that a federal common 
law nuisance claim for damages was displaced, when the Supreme 
Court had already held such claims for injunctive relief were 
displaced); accord Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. 
National Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1981). Common 
law claims are displaced when the “statutory scheme established 
by Congress provides a forum for the pursuit of [plaintiff’s] claims 
before expert agencies” or in courts. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 326. 
In our case, Mana’s claims are displaced because the CAA 
affords “multiple avenues for enforcement” and “provides a means 
to seek limits on emissions of carbon dioxide. . .the same relief the 
plaintiffs seek by invoking federal common law.” AEP, 564 U.S. at 
425. In addition to government-led administrative, civil, and 
criminal enforcement provisions, 42 U.S.C. §§7411(c), 7411(d), 
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7413, 7414, the CAA includes a “Citizen Suit” provision that 
permits any person to bring a private, civil enforcement action 
against a corporation, government entity, or individual in federal 
court if states or the EPA fail to enforce emissions standards 
against regulated sources. AEP, 564 U.S. at 425 (citing 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7604(a)). Further, states and private parties may petition for a 
rulemaking “if the EPA does not set emissions limits for a 
particular pollutant or source of pollution.” AEP, 564 U.S. at 425 
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1)). In addition, Mana may engage the 
government of A’Na Atu to utilize the CAA’s “International Air 
Pollution” provision, which requires the EPA and states take 
remedial action when “air pollutant[s]. . . emitted within the 
United States. . .endanger public health or welfare in a foreign 
country.” 42 U.S.C. § 7415(a). This provision requires states to 
“prevent or eliminate the endangerment” and invite affected 
foreign nations to participate in any associated public hearing. Id. 
at §7415(b). The combination of the CAA’s Citizen Suit, petition for 
rulemaking, and International Air Pollution provisions afford 
Mana the opportunity to impose GHG emission limits. 
In sum, the CAA displaces Mana’s Trail Smelter claim because 
Mana seeks to redress harm caused by GHG emissions, and the 
Supreme Court, Ninth Circuit, and multiple district courts have 
concluded the Act displaces such claims based on the its 
comprehensive scheme addressing emissions and its array of 
mechanisms to enforce or change emissions standards. 
 
V. Plaintiffs Fail to State a Valid Claim Under the Public 
Trust Doctrine and Due Process Clause of the United States 
Constitution 
 
This court should uphold the District Court’s dismissal of 
Plaintiffs’ claim under the public trust doctrine and the Due 
Process clause of the United States Constitution. These doctrines 
do not provide relief to Plaintiffs because: (A) the public trust 
doctrine does not provide protections to the global climate system; 
and (B) there is no fundamental right to a healthy and stable 
climate. 
A. The public trust doctrine does not provide a federal 
cause of action nor provide relief for Plaintiffs’ 
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alleged climate-induced injuries 
The District Court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claim under the 
public trust doctrine should be upheld because the scope of the 
public trust doctrine does not provide federal protections, nor 
protections to the global climate system. The common law public 
trust doctrine does not provide protections for resources outside of 
navigable rivers and tidal waters. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 479 (1988); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. State of 
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892). Moreover, the public trust 
doctrine does not allow suits against the federal government 
because “the public trust doctrine remains a matter of state law.” 
PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 603 (2012). Therefore, 
any relief sought by Plaintiffs under the public trust doctrine 
would require this court to take two unprecedented steps by 
creating a federal public trust doctrine and expanding the doctrine 
beyond the scope allowed by any state or federal court. 
1. The public trust doctrine applies to waterways, 
not the climate system 
The public trust doctrine is a long-standing doctrine with roots 
firmly in ancient common law. See PPL Montana, 565 U.S. at 603. 
However, the American version of doctrine, ever since it was 
announced in Illinois Central, has been used exclusively to protect 
waterways and their surrounding banks and shores from 
monopolization by private parties and has never been extended to 
provide protections to the atmosphere or global climate system. 
146 U.S. 387; see, e.g. Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 13 
(D.D.C. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 
F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (per curium) (“[Plaintiffs] have cited no 
cases, and the Court is aware of none, that have expanded the 
doctrine to protect the atmosphere.”); Aronow v. State, 2012 WL 
4476642 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012) (same). Under the American 
common law public trust doctrine, states are trustees to the public 
to ensure submerged lands under navigable and tidal waters are 
not disposed of in a way that would cause “substantial impairment 
of the interest of the public in the waters” in navigation, fishing, or 
commerce. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 435. Here, in asking the 
court to provide global atmospheric protections, Plaintiffs are 
asking the court to extend the doctrine far beyond what any court 
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has ever recognized. Therefore, this court should uphold the 
District Court’s dismissal of the claim. 
2. The public doctrine does not provide a federal 
cause of action 
Plaintiffs’ public trust claim is also legally deficient because it 
fails to bring a valid federal cause of action, since the public trust 
doctrine is purely a matter of state law. PPL Montana, 565 U.S. 
576, 603–04. This court should follow the lead of the D.C. Circuit, 
which dismissed a public trust claim, almost identical to Plaintiffs’, 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the doctrine is not a 
matter of federal law. Alec L. ex rel. Loorz, 561 Fed. App’x at 8 
(citing PPL Montana, 566 U.S. at 603–04); see also W. Indian Co. 
v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 844 F.2d 1007, 1019 (3d Cir. 1988). 
Plaintiffs’ federal question claim would require this court to impose 
public trust duties on the federal government, an action no court 
has ever recognized in a final judgement. See Alec L., 863 F. Supp. 
2d at 13. Although, Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 
(D. Or. 2016), allowed a similar claim to survive a motion to 
dismiss, the District Court in our case properly chose to not follow 
that unprecedented, singular, initial ruling of the District Court 
for the District of Oregon. R. at 11. As the overwhelming weight of 
legal precedent counsels against imposing such new obligations on 
the federal government, this court should uphold the District 
Court’s dismissal as a matter of law. 
B. There is no constitutional right to protection of a 
healthy or stable climate 
Even if Plaintiffs could use the public trust doctrine as a cause 
of action to bring their substantive Due Process claim, there is not 
a constitutional right as claimed by Plaintiffs. First, Plaintiffs are 
asking this court to go where no court has gone before by 
announcing a fundamental right to stable and healthy climate 
system under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution. Second, the Due Process Clause 
does not impose an affirmative duty on the government to protect 
against private harm, even when their actions substantially 
increase risk of harm. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of 
Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
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1. History and tradition do not provide a right to a 
stable climate 
While cases like Plaintiffs’ claim have been heard by courts 
across the nation, no federal court has ever found that Americans 
have a constitutional right to be protected from general 
environmental harm. In fact, federal courts have consistently 
rebuffed similar attempts to provide constitutional protections for 
the climate or a “pollution-free environment.” Nat’l Sea Clammers 
Ass’n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222, 1237–38 (3d. Cir. 1980), 
dismissed and vacated in part on other grounds 453 U.S. 1 (1981).8 
 
In order for Plaintiffs’ claim to succeed, this court would have 
to go against all other courts and announce a new fundamental 
right to government protection of a healthy and stable climate. The 
steady refusal of courts to entertain substantive Due Process 
claims for climate or environmental protections speaks to the 
judiciary’s cautious approach in announcing new fundamental Due 
Process rights. The Supreme Court insists any proposed 
fundamental Due Process right must be “rooted in history and 
tradition,” Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989), and 
the Court uses the “utmost care when [they] are asked to break 
new ground in [the] field.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 
720 (1997); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993). Similar to 
 
8 See also Concerned Citizens of Neb. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 970 
F.2d 421, 426 (8th Cir. 1992) (no right to be free from environmental harm from 
radioactive waste); Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1970) (no 
constitutional right to be protected from unnecessary and unreasonable 
environmental degradation and destruction); S.F. Chapter of A. Philip Randolph 
Inst. v. EPA, No. C 07-04936 CRB, 2008 WL 859985, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 
2008) (“Plaintiffs also allege deprivation of the right to be free of climate change 
pollution, but that right is not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment either.”); 
Pinkney v. Ohio Envtl. Prot. Agency, 375 F. Supp. 305, 310 (N.D. Ohio 1974) 
(“[T]he Court has not found a guarantee of the fundamental right to a healthful 
environment implicitly or explicitly in the Constitution.”); Gasper v. La. Stadium 
& Exposition Dist., 418 F. Supp. 716, 720–21 (E.D. La. 1976) (“[T]he courts have 
never seriously considered the right to a clean environment to be constitutionally 
protected under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments”), aff’d, 577 F.2d 897 (5th 
Cir. 1978); MacNamara v. Cnty. Council of Sussex Cnty., 738 F. Supp. 134, 142-
43 (D. Del. 1990), aff'd 922 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1990); Sequoyah v. Tenn. Valley 
Auth., 480 F. Supp. 608, 611 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), aff’d, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 
1980); Upper W. Fork Watershed Assoc. v. Corps of Eng’rs, U. S. Army, 414 F. 
Supp. 908, 931–32 (N.D. W.Va. 1976) aff’d, 556 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1977); Hagedorn 
v. Union Carbide Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1061, 1064–65 (N.D. W. Va. 1973); Tanner 
v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532, 537 (S.D. Tex. 1972).   
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their predecessors in District and Circuit courts around the 
country, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a “deeply rooted in 
our legal tradition” in a healthy and stable climate. Glucksberg, 
521 U.S. at 722. To the contrary, the record shows the climate has 
not been historically stable, the United States has a history of 
supporting industries that produce GHG emissions, and Congress 
only recently provided limited statutory protections for the 
environment. R. at 4, 6, 10. 
2. There is no constitutional right for protection 
against private harm 
In the District Court proceedings, Plaintiffs asserted a 
fundamental right to a healthy and stable climate by relying on an 
unprecedented denial of a motion to dismiss by the Oregon District 
Court. R. at 11, citing Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1251–52. The 
Supreme Court in DeShaney held the Due Process Clause does not 
impose an affirmative duty on the government to protect against 
private harm, even when their actions substantially increase risk 
of harm. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. 189. The Juliana District Court 
denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss by relying on a Ninth 
Circuit “government-caused danger” exception to the Supreme 
Court’s DeShaney rule. This exception does not apply to the case 
at bar because the United States government does not have the 
required “special relationship” with Plaintiffs (as it would with 
persons in its physical custody). DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197. 
Further, the government here did not literally and directly create 
the danger. Id. (holding state’s placement of a child in an abusive 
home, resulting in coma and permanent brain damage, was not a 
“deprivation” of Due Process). 
Moreover, Plaintiffs here have not pled sufficient facts to show 
the United States’ conduct “place[d] a person in peril in deliberate 
indifference to their safety.” Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1251 
(citing Penilla v. City of Huntington Park, 115 F.3d 707, 709 (9th 
Cir. 1997)). In Juliana, the Oregon District Court admitted that 
this rigorous standard “pose[d] a significant challenge for 
plaintiffs,” but allowed the claim to move forward, finding the 
plaintiffs alleged that defendants had acted with the requisite 
state of mind, an allegation the court was required to accept as 
true. Id. at 1252. The record in this case, on the other hand, 
contains no allegation that the U.S. government acted with 
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deliberate indifference towards Plaintiffs’ safety. The record states 
that U.S. government has only been aware of the dangers of 
climate change since the 1990s, long after the vast majority of GHG 
emissions authorized by the government took place. R. at 6, 11. 
Since learning of the dangers of climate change, the government 
has taken steps to reduce GHGs in an effort to slow climate change. 
R. at 6–7. Here, the court would have to go beyond the Ninth 
Circuit’s government-caused danger rule requiring “deliberate 
indifference,” and allow claims of negligence or strict liability to 
impose a duty to act on the government. 
Plaintiffs here are not only asking this court to follow Juliana, 
they are asking this court to go further by extending the danger-
creation exception to DeShaney far beyond where even the Oregon 
District Court took the doctrine, for a Due Process right that does 
not yet exist. Particularly in the face of consistent precedent 
declining to extend Due Process rights to environmental 
protection, see supra note 2, a single, unprecedented case surviving 
a motion dismiss at the district court level is insufficient to 
constitute a right “objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, 
such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were 
sacrificed,” as required to establish a new fundamental right. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S., at 720–721 (internal quotations omitted). 
Therefore, this court should uphold the District Court’s dismissal 
for failure to state a valid claim. 
 
VI. Plaintiffs’ Public Trust Doctrine and ATS Claims are 
Barred as Nonjusticiable Political Questions 
 
Even if Plaintiffs presented valid ATS and public trust 
doctrine claims, this court should dismiss them as nonjusticiable 
political questions. While the judiciary is well-equipped to deal 
with ATS, public trust, and Due Process claims generally, 
Plaintiffs claims stretch these causes of action to the point where 
they improperly tread on the executive and legislative branches of 
the federal government. These claims are nonjusticiable because 
they are “not legal in nature,” and concern complex issues of 
“national polic[y]” that courts reserve for those political branches 
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of the government. Japan Whaling Ass’n v. American Cetacean 
Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986). A case presents a nonjusticiable 
political question if any of the six Baker v. Carr tests are met: 
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political 
question is found [i] a textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or 
[ii] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for 
resolving it; or [iii] the impossibility of deciding without an initial 
policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; 
or [iv] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent 
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate 
branches of government; or [v] an unusual need for unquestioning 
adherence to a political decision already made; or [vi] the 
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements 
by various departments on one question.  
 
369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). When applying the Baker tests, courts 
must engage in a “discriminating inquiry into the precise facts and 
posture of the particular case.” Id. 
A. Application of the first three Baker tests bar 
Plaintiffs’ claims 
The Supreme Court noted that the Baker tests “are probably 
listed in descending order of both importance and certainty.” Vieth 
v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004). In the context of ATS 
litigation, the Court has noted the separation-of-powers issues 
addressed under the first three Baker tests are of particular and 
serious concern. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727–28. Here, a “discriminating 
inquiry” using the first three Baker tests show both of Plaintiffs’ 
claims are nonjusticiable, as they would require the court to create 
a cause of action available to everyone in the world and would 
require the judiciary to make complex scientific and policy 
judgements the Constitution reserves for the political branches of 
the government. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
1. Plaintiffs’ claims involve foreign policy decision 
designated to the executive and legislative 
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branches 
Under the first Baker test, claims are nonjusticiable political 
questions where “constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department” is evident. Id. The U.S. 
Constitution vests Congress with the authority “[t]o regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations and among the several States, and 
with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Matters of 
foreign policy and national security “are rarely proper subjects for 
judicial intervention.” Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981). 
Here, both claims brought by Plaintiffs tread on the powers of 
the executive and legislative branches because they entangle 
critical decisions of foreign climate change policy, not matters that 
merely touch foreign relations. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 211. 
Plaintiffs are essentially asking this court to curb otherwise lawful 
activities that rely on fossil fuels worldwide, instead of allowing 
the political branches to continue to craft legislative solutions that 
balance environmental, energy, and economic needs. Solutions to 
the complex and global problem of climate change “cannot be 
prescribed in a vacuum.” AEP, 564 U.S. at 427. This sensitive 
balance “is appropriately vested in branches of the government 
which are periodically subject to electoral accountability.” Gilligan 
v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973). This court should avoid wading 
into international climate change and energy policy debates the 
executive and legislative branches have already been addressing 
though international treaties and legislation for decades. R. at 6–
8. For example, the United States has entered into United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris 
Agreement and Congress has given the EPA the authority to 
regulate GHG emissions under the Clean Air Act. R. at 7; see 
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 531. The fact that the current 
administration has voiced its intention to withdraw from some past 
steps addressing climate change does not give the judiciary 
authority to step in to fill the executive or legislative branches’ 
policy making position. 
2. Plaintiffs’ claims lack judicially discoverable 
and manageable standards and require the 
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court to make an initial policy determination. 
Plaintiffs’ claims are nonjusticiable under the second and third 
Baker tests because they would require the court to make a policy 
determination about appropriate quantities and methods to reduce 
GHG emissions. See AEP, 654 U.S. 428. Under the second and 
third Baker tests, a case is nonjusticiable for a “lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards,” or if it requires the court 
to make an “initial policy determination of a kind clearly for 
nonjudicial discretion.” Baker 369 U.S. at 217. A claim lacks 
judicially discoverable and manageable standards if it presents 
“complex[,] subtle” issues in which “courts have less competence” 
than the political branches of the government. See Gilligan, 413 
U.S. at 10. In regulating climate change and GHGs, the Supreme 
Court recognized that courts “have neither the expertise nor the 
authority to evaluate” the fundamental economic, social, and 
national security policy issues raised by the regulation of 
greenhouse gases, Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533, and “lack the 
scientific, economic, and technological resources [of] an agency. . .” 
to regulate climate change. AEP, 564 U.S. at 428. Plaintiffs fail to 
point to an accepted standard or methodology the court could 
employ to address these complicated inquiries. 
The implications of Plaintiffs’ common law-based claims are 
sweeping; they would allow any party in the world who could allege 
injury from climate change to a make a claim against any party 
who is responsible in some way for producing GHG emissions. See 
AEP, 564 U.S. at 428–29. Courts across the country would be 
required to determine whether and to what extent each GHG 
producer created climate changed-induced damages using the 
general principals of tort and public trust law. Adjudicating these 
disputes would also require the court to make an “initial policy 
determination” about the appropriate level of GHGs each party can 
produce without creating unreasonable harm to the climate or 
significantly impairing the alleged atmospheric trust. See 
Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 855. Adding in the fact that GHG emissions 
do not adhere to geographically discoverable borders makes the 
impact of these emissions on an individual plaintiff even more 
difficult to manage. 
 Even if this court had the authority to enact such a remedy, 
reducing the emissions of the United States would not prevent 
Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries because no “judicially discoverable 
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standard” can simply stop climate global climate change and sea 
level rise. Adjudicating this claim would require individual federal 
judges to make intricate international policy decisions on climate 
change and enact an appropriate standard for every GHG emitter 
in the nation. Since courts are not in a possession to make such 
initial policy determinations or manage a standard for granting 
Plaintiffs’ relief, this court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims as 
nonjusticiable. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Plaintiffs are ultimately asking this court to legislate common 
law solutions to the global problem of climate change, when such 
solutions have already been or should be decided by the political 
branches. Therefore, this court should affirm the District Court’s 
holding that the CAA displaces Plaintiffs’ claim brought under the 
ATS for HexonGlobal’s alleged violations of the Trail Smelter 
Principle. This court should also affirm District Court’s denial to 
extend an unprecedented Due Process-based public trust claim to 
government protection of a stable climate system. Further, to the 
extent such claims are not otherwise barred, this court should find 
they are barred by the political questions doctrine, as they present 
sensitive international policy decisions. Finally, this court should 
not craft its decision on grounds broader than necessary to resolve 
the case. Although this court should dispose of Plaintiffs’ claims for 
the aforementioned reasons, this court should not draw its holding 
so broadly as to bar all ATS claims against corporate defendants 
or all claims under Trail Smelter Principle for other kinds of 
emissions harms, as such categorical bars would undermine 
Congressional intent and international law. 
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